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HCFCD's approval of the Lakewood Grove subdivision. The court
found that the important factor in the public-use determination was
the character of the right inuring to the public, not the extent to which
the public exercised its right. Thus, it was immaterial if the use was
limited to citizens of a local neighborhood, so long as it was open to all
who choose to avail themselves of it. The court found that the District's evidence that both the ditch expansion and the pond construction would serve the public purpose of draining excess water from the
area sufficed for a showing of public use.
Courts do not review a condemnor's exercise of its discretion to determine public necessity without a showing that the condemnor acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, or arbitrarily and capriciously. Therefore,
the second issue of disputed fact reviewed by the court was whether the
District acted fraudulently or arbitrarily in concluding that public necessity justified condemning the property. Newsom argued that the
District did not use a reasonable basis for their determination of necessity, but rather abdicated its responsibilities to the developers. The
court found that the condemnation agreements signed by the District
and the private developers, requiring the developers to front all costs
of the condemnation and providing that the District would not have to
reimburse the developers if the condemnation proceedings were unsuccessful for any reason, raised an inference that the District had abdicated its discretion to determine whether the condemnation was
backed by public necessity. Thus, the court found that a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the utility district acted arbitrarily and
capriciously precluded summary judgment.
Keely Downs
Grimes v. Texas, No. 03-04-00154, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6963 (Tex.
App. Aug. 26, 2005) (holding that the order from the Texas Railroad
Commission granting a permit to Endeavor Energy Resources to operate a saltwater disposal well was supported by substantial evidence, in
the public interest, and not arbitrary or capricious).
The Texas Railroad Commission ("Commission") granted a permit
to Endeavor Energy Resources ("Endeavor") to operate a saltwater disposal well located on one-third of a surface estate, which Endeavor
leased from Howard Hill Grimes ("Grimes"). Grimes, the owner of
two-thirds of the surface estate and an undivided interest in the mineral estate of the tract that he leased to Endeavor, opposed Endeavor's
permit application because he feared the saltwater operations on the
adjacent land would damage his groundwater and surface estate.
After the Commission granted a permit to Endeavor to operate a
saltwater disposal well, Grimes brought suit appealing the Commission's order issuing the permit. The District Court of Travis County,
53rd Judicial District, affirmed the Commission's order granting the
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permit to Endeavor to operate a saltwater disposal well. Grimes appealed the district court's decision to the Texas Court of Appeals.
Grimes asserted that the Commission's decision to grant the permit
to operate the saltwater disposal well was arbitrary and capricious and,
therefore, the court must overturn it. He claimed that there was not
substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision because it
failed to take into account the public interest requirement of the permitting process under the water code.
The crux of the substantial evidence analysis is whether the
agency's factual findings are reasonable in light of the evidence from
which they were purportedly inferred. In this case, the court had to
consider whether the Commission's factual findings supported its decision in light of the public interest requirement process under the water
code.
The court determined there is no controlling precedent interpreting what considerations the Commission may weigh when deciding
whether granting a disposal well operating permit is in the public interest. However, the Commission's purpose includes preventing waste,
conserving natural resources, and preventing pollution. The Commission considered these issues in reaching its decision and determined
that the disposal operations, if conducted under certain conditions
specified in the permit, would not endanger certain natural resource
or cause pollution of the fresh water stratum.
The court found the Commission's determination that the well
would help conserve some natural resources and prevent pollution of
the stratum satisfied the Commission's public interest requirement
under the water code. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the Commission's decision was reasonable in light of the
evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.
Robert Stevens
City of Shoreacres v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 166 S.W.3d 825
(Tex. App. 2005) (holding city of Shoreacres' claims were moot because the Port of Houston Authority was not required to obtain state
authorization from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
independent of the federal dredge-and-fill permit it received from the
Army Corps of Engineers).
The Port of Houston Authority ("Port") sought to obtain a federal
Clean Water Act dredge-and-fill permit ("404 permit") from the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and a section 401 certification from the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ("Commission") in relation to the construction of a cargo and cruise ship terminal complex
called the Bayport Project. 401 certification requires a project to meet
state water quality standards and be consistent with state coastal management. On December 16, 2005, the Commission issued the 401 cer-

